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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

KELLY RENEE PETERSON,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

Civil No. 860120

JERRY ALLEN PETERSON,
Defendant/Respondent.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 10, 1981, the parties hereto were married
(Tr. at 18).
at 18).

Subsequently, two children were born to them (Tr.

The parties to this action maintained one residence

throughout their marriage at Scipio, Utah (Tr. at 8, lines 6-9;
Tr. at 19, lines 1-5). This home, together with a 10.5 acre
tract upon which it was located, was brought into the marriage by
defendant/respondent (hereinafter "defendant") (Tr. at 61, lines
22-23).

Defendant testified that he felt the value of the three-

bedroom home (Tr. at 23, line 7) and 10.5 acres was $2 6,000 (Tr.
at 57-58) ; plaintiff/appellant (hereinafter "Kelly") felt the
home and land were worth $40,000 (Tr. at 56, lines 1-5). At the
time of trial, Kelly was attempting to keep her small business

1

in Nephi from failing (Tr. at 53, lines 103). The business has
since failed.
Kelly testified at trial that she needed the home to
provide a place to live for herself and the two minor children of
the parties (Tr. at 38, line 25), and that she filed a divorce
only after defendant requested her to do so (Tr. at 45, lines 2125) and after she knew that defendant was seeing another woman
(Tr. at 35).
Testimony at trial brought out that defendant was
unemployed, and that his regular line of work was construction
and often required that defendant reside away from the Scipio
home (Tr. at 59, 60; Tr. at 3, line 16).

Since trial, Kelly and

the two minor children have left the former residence of the
parties pursuant to the Divorce Decree (D.D. at 4, paragraph 10)
and defendant has resided for several months in Southern
California.

Although Kelly's parents have a small apartment

building in Nephi, Utah, any generosity on their part in asking
Kelly to reside in an apartment is contingent upon a vacancy (Tr.
at 40, lines 10-12).
A washer and dryer were brought into the marriage by
defendant (Tr. at 33, lines 20-25) and a horse was purchased by
the parties during their marriage, which defendant testified he
intended to use for the children's benefit (Tr. at 63, lines 1619).

The horse has since been sold by defendant, and Kelly

continues to have difficulty washing and drying the children's
clothes because the washer and dryer were awarded to defendant
(D.D. at 3, paragraph 7).

The Divorce Decree ordered defendant
2

to pay $100 per month per child as support money "[a]s long as
defendant is drawing unemployment compensation" of $830.00 per
month (D.D. at 2, paragraph 4).

At the time of trial, Kelly had

been receiving public assistance and her circumstances since
trial have necessitated continuous public assistance from the
Utah State Department of Social Services since being forced out
of the former residence of the parties in June, 1986.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
U.C.A. Section 30-3-5(1) specifically suggests that the
trial court has discretion to make such orders in the best
interests of equity and all parties. After five years of
marriage and two children, equity requires that appellant Kelly
Peterson and the two children of the parties be permitted to
occupy the former home and land of the parties until said
children reach majority.

The present order subjects Kelly

Peterson to an impossible and confining situation of attempting
to raise the children with only Social Services7 assistance
because she has little training.

And the divorce decree at

present purports to condition defendant's support obligation
entirely on the continuation of unemployment benefits at the
present level. Only a review and reversal of these orders to
allow Kelly Peterson to live in the parties' former residence and
a definite support requirement from defendant will correct the
misunderstanding and misapplication of law in this matter.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
FORCING PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT AND HER TWO MINOR
CHILDREN OUT OF THE PARTIES' FORMER RESIDENCE
3

AND FORCING THEM TO SEARCH ELSEWHERE FOR
SHELTER.
The applicable statute in this appeal states as
follows: "When a decree of divorce is rendered, a court may
include in it such orders in relation to the children, property
and parties, and the maintenance and health care of the parties
and children, as may be equitable,"
(1979, as amended).

U.C.A. Section 30-3-5(1)

The lower court's awarding defendant the

former residence of the parties together with its surrounding
real property of 10.5 acres as of June 1986, thereafter leaving
plaintiff/appellant Kelly Peterson to seek shelter for herself
and two small children was apparently based on the fact that said
real estate was brought into the marriage by the defendant;
however, the above-referenced statute specifically directs lower
courts to make "such orders in relation to the children property
and parties . . . as may be equitable."

U.C.A. Section 3 0-3-

5(1) (1979).
In the Utah Supreme Court case of Enalert v. Enalert.
575 P.21 1274, 1276 (Utah 1978), this court took a broad view of
the trial court's duty to make an equitable division of property,
stating that it encompassed "all the assets of every nature
possessed by the parties, wherever obtained and from whatever
source derived . . . ." And in Doau v. Doau, 652 P. 2d 1308 (Utah
1981) , this court cited its earlier decision in DeRose v. DeRose,
19 Utah 2d 77, 79, 426 P.2d 221, 222 (1967) in which it held as
follows:
Changes [in the trial court determination]
should be made if that seems essential to the
4

accomplishment of the desired objectives of
the decree: that is, to make such arrangement
of the property and economic resources of the
parties that they will have the best possible
opportunity to reconstruct their lives on a
happy and useful basis for themselves and
their children.
Doau v. Doau, supra, at 1311. The Doau court continued that a
change in the trial court's determination was required where the
appellant "may be deprived of all ongoing financial support at
the very time of life when she is most in need . . . ."

Id. The

case of Joraensen v. Joraenson. 667 P.2d 22 (Utah 1982) is not on
point.

In Joraensen, only one child was born to the marriage,

and the marriage lasted just two years. The custodial parent was
not required to apply for public assistance.

Id. at 23.

The appellant herein has necessarily been deprived of
all ongoing financial support due to her being ordered out of the
former residence of the parties, predictably losing her business
opportunity, and presently being a tenant at will in her parents7
apartment subject to availability.

In the meantime, Kelly, our

appellant, has received no assistance from defendant since the
State Department of Social Services promptly takes any support
payments in return for its own assistance to Kelly and her two
small children.

Realistically, the only benefit defendant can

continue to provide Kelly during these difficult economic times
where defendant is employed for only short periods of time is
shelter from the elements. The home and land in Scipio is held
in high regard by Kelly and the children, a stark contrast from
the defendant's feelings as evidenced by the parties' respective
$40,000 and $26,000 estimates of its fair market value. Regard5

less of the source of the property, Kelly should be awarded a onehalf interest in the property or at least a right to live in the
home with the children until they reach majority.
an equitable outcome.

This would be

As it stands, Kelly and the children have

no place to go and Kelly's parents are made to feel the burden of
support properly attributed to defendant.
Given Kelly's education and training, or lack thereof,
she will have no chance to make something of herself for the
monetary benefit of her little family under present
circumstances, and should be allowed to regain possession of the
home and raise the children of the parties.

Kelly has been

subject to a misunderstanding or misapplication of Section 30-35(1) which has resulted in substantial prejudicial error, and
requires a change in the trial court's determination.
II. THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
MAKING DEFENDANT'S CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS TO
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT CONTINGENT UPON DEFENDANT'S
MAINTAINING A CERTAIN LEVEL OF UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION.
Under the present divorce decree, defendant technically
is under no obligation to make support payments to Kelly or to
the Department of Social Services if his unemployment
compensation should fall below $83 0 per month, or if his
unemployment compensation were to cease.

This possibility has

great impact on both Kelly and the State of Utah.

If support

obligations can be waived by narrow language in a divorce decree
then healthy fathers can suddenly be excused from traditional

6

support requriements already under severe attack in our society
today.
Appellant's counsel has found no cases in point
regarding nebulous support obligations such as that promised
defendant in the divorce decree in this matter; however, the
decree at the least should be revised to require monthly payments
not contingent upon employment or an unemployment compensation
level.
III. THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
REFUSING TO AWARD THE USE OF THE PARTIES' WASHER
AND DRYER TO PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT AS LONG AS THE
PARTIES' CHILDREN ARE MINORS.
As to property settlement, the parties' stipulation did
not touch upon the disposition of the washer and dryer, or the
horse.

The obvious need of a young mother with two children

under five years old for a washer and dryer suggests that the
present property settlement did not meet the general intent of
Section 3 0-3-5(1) or provide the parties with those things
required to further their happiness consistent with DeRose and
Dogu, supra, to the great prejudice of the appellant.

Defendant

should be required to remit to appellant the proceeds from the
sale of the horse, and allow her an opportunity to repurchase
said horse.
CONCLUSION
The trial court has summarily dismissed the obvious
needs of the parties, the equities of this matter, and applicable
law in requiring Kelly and the children to seek another home

7

after five years of marriage.

Short of a one-half interest in

the home and property, the lower court's order should be reversed
with directions to award Kelly the right to reside with the
children in the parties' former home, until said children reach
their majority.

And defendant's child support obligation should

not be made dependent upon his receiving a certain level of
unemployment compensation, since the present order shocks the
conscience.

Finally, a property settlement accordingly is in

order insofar as the washer and dryer are concerned.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7th day of November, 1986.

Dwight J.| L. Epp) son
Attorneyifor PI
tiff/Appellant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing BRIEF was sent this 7th day of November, 1986, to the
following:
Richard K. Glauser
McKay, Burton & Thurman
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent
10 East South Temple, Suite 12 00
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 /-,
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30-3-5

HUSBAND AND WIFE

Power of court to vacate decree of divorce
or separation upon request of both parties, 3
ALR 3d 1216.
Prayer to impress trust upon property or
otherwise settle property rights, propriety of
inclusion in bill for divorce or annulment, 93
ALR 327.

Standing of strangers to divorce proceeding to attack validity of divorce decree, 12
ALR 2d 717.
Sufficiency of allegation of adultery in suit
for divorce, 2 ALR 1621.
Vacating or setting aside divorce decree
after remarriage of party, 17 ALR 4th 1153.

30-3-5. Disposition of property - Maintenance and health care of
parties and children — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Custody and visitation — Termination of alimony. (1) When a decree of
divorce is rendered, the court may include in it such orders in relation to
the children, property and parties, and the maintenance and health care
of the parties and children, as may be equitable. The court shall include
in every decree of divorce an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of the
dependent children. If coverage is available at a reasonable cost, the court
may also include an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of
\ appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for those children.
^The court shall have continuing jurisdiction to make such subsequent
changes or new orders with respect to the support and maintenance of the
parties, the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, and
health and dental care, or the distribution of the property as shall be reasonable and necessary. Visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and
other relatives shall take into consideration the welfare of the child.
(2) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order
of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse shall automatically terminate upon the remarriage of that former spouse, unless that
marriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio, in which case alimony
shall resume, providing that the party paying alimony be made a party
to the action of annulment and that party's rights are determined.
(3) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
shall be terminated upon application of that party establishing that the
former spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex, unless it is
further established by the person receiving alimony that the relationship
or association between them is without any sexual contact.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1212; L.
1909, ch. 109, § 4; C.L. 1917, § 3000; R.S. 1933
& C. 1943, 40-3-5; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 3; 1975, ch.
81, § 1; 1979, ch. 110, § 1; 1984, ch. 13, § 1.
Compiler's Notes.
Analogous former statutes, Comp. Laws
1876, § 1155; 2 Comp. Laws 1888, § 2606.
The 1969 amendment deleted a provision
that children ten years of age and of sound
mind have the privilege of selecting the parent to which they will attach themselves; and
substituted the fourth sentence of subsec. (1)
for "Such subsequent changes or new orders

may be made by the court with respect to the
disposal of the children or the distribution of
property as shall be reasonable and proper."
The 1975 amendment added the last sentence of subsec. (1).
The 1979 amendment added subsecs. (2)
and (3).
The 1984 amendment substituted "include
in it" for "make" in the first sentence of
subsec. (1); inserted the second and third sentences in subsec. (1); inserted "and health
and dental care" in the fourth sentence of
subsec. (1); and made minor changes in
phraseology and punctuation.
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MARCUS TAYLOR (3203)
LABRUM § TAYLOR
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
108 NORTH MAIN STREET
P.O. BOX 724
RICHFIELD, UTAH 84701
(801)896-6484

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF MILLARD COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

KELLY RENEE PETERSON and
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES,

*

*
Plaintiffs,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

*

vs.
JERRY ALLEN PETERSON,

Civil No. 79S8

Defendant•
*

This cause was tried to the Court sitting without a jury on November
13, 198S, the Honorable Cullen Y. Chrj^stensen, Fourth Judicial District Judge
presiding, the parties each appearing in person and by counsel, a stipulation
having been read into the record wherein and whereby the parties stipulated to
a division of certain personal property, evidence having then been offered and
received, the Court having issued a memorandum decision, and having directed
that the Utah State Department of Social Services be named as a party
Plaintiff to facilitate an award of judgment against Defendant for public
assistance provided to Plaintiff and her two minor children, now therefore,
the Court finds and concludes as follows:

Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law
Peterson et al vs. Peterson
Civil No, 7958
- 2 -

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff and Defendant are wife and husband having married on

January 10, 1981.
2.

Plaintiff was an actual and bona fide resident of Millard County,

Utah for more than three months immediately prior to the filing of the
Complaint herein.
3.

Two children have been born as issue of said marriage, to wit:

Judy Lynn Peterson, a girl, born March 12, 1982 and Jeffrey All in Peterson, a
boy, born January 18, 1984.
4.

Plaintiff is a fit and proper person to have the care, custody

and control of said minor children, subject to reasonable rights of visitation
in and for Defendant, which visitation rights are hereby defined as follows:
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
I.
Sunday.
5.

One-half of the Christmas holiday,
One-half of the Thanksgiving holiday,
Alternating visits on every other holiday,
Every other birthday.
Each Father's Day.
One month summer visit for each child when age 4 or less,
Five week summer visit for each child when age 5,
Six week summer visit for each child when age 6.
Every other weekend from 6:00 p.m. Friday to 6:00 p.m.

Defendant should provide Plaintiff with advance notice of his

intent to exercise visitation rights, which notice shall be not less than 48
hours for other than summer visits, and not less than 2 weeks for summer
visits.
6.

That for several months prior to the filing of the action and as

a continual course of conduct the Defendant treated the Plaintiff cruelly,

Findings o£ Fact and
Conclusions of Law
Peterson et al vs. Peterson
Civil No. 7958
- 3 -

causing her great mental distress and suffering, more in particular as follows:
A.

Defendant kept company with another woman over the
objections of Plaintiff.

7.

That the parties have been separated since July, 1985.

8.

That Plaintiff has no net monthly income, however, Plaintiff is

receiving Public Assistance; that Plaintiff claims monthly living expenses of
$1,176.00, plus debt service of $296.13; that Plaintiff is presently residing
in the family home at Scipio, Utah and is commuting to Delta, Utah, where she
operates a small gift shop; that said gift shop has been operating at a loss;
that by reason of Plaintiff1s limited job experience and training it is not
likely that Plaintiff will be able to earn significantly more than minimum
wage; that the condition of Plaintiff1s health is good.
9.

That Defendant has net monthly income of $830.00 from

unemployment compensation; that Defendant, when he is employed, customarily
can earn approximately $11.50 per hour, which will produce gross monthly
income based on 40 hours per week of $1,978.00 per month and net income of
$1,720.00 per month; Defendant claims monthly living expenses of $750.00, plus
debt service of $146.00; Defendant presently resides out of the family home;
that by reason of Defendant's job experience and training it is likely that
Defendant will be able to earn as much as last above indicated; that the
condition of Defendant's health is good.
10.

That the parties respectively brought the following assets into

the marriage:

Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law
Peterson et al vs. Peterson
Civil No, 7958
4 -

Plaintiff: Miscellaneous furniture of undetermined value.
Defendant: (A) Miscellaneous furniture of
undetermined value, includes a washer and dryer.
(B) 10.5 acres of land with residence
situate thereon and with 5 shares of water stock,
all having a fair value at the time of the
marriage of $26,000.00.
10Ao

That the parties have accumulated the following assets during

the course of the marriage:
ITEM

ENCUMBRANCE

VALUE

(A) Increased value in 10.S
(B)
(C)
(D)

(E)
(F)

acres of land, residence and
5 shares of water stock.
Gift shop, Delta
1983 Ford and a motorcycle
Horse
Camera
1978 Ford truck
11.

(A) Fillmore Hospital
(B) Nephi Hospital
(C) Payson Hospital
(D) Commercial Credit
(E)'"Scipio Garage
(F) -Valley Bank
(G) Zions Bank
Eva Meeker-

(I) Classic Sales
12.

$

— 0 —
5,700.00 -r°6,000.00 J<>ct
—0—

—o—
1,200.00

That the parties owe the following marital debts:
CREDITOR

(H)

$ 4,000.00
3,000.00
4,800.00
800.00
500.00
1,200.00

AMOUNT/PAYABLE

SECURITY

$ 200.00
3,300.00
220.00
1,500.00
170.00
1,200.00/146.00 p/m
6,000.00/296.00 p/m
©3,000.00
2,700.00/30.00

—0—

—o—
—0—
—
0—
—
—0
truck
car and
motorcycle

«0—
p/m

gift shop

That the parties respectively claim attorney's fees incurred in

connection herewith as follows:
Plaintiff: $1,200.00, based on 15 hours at $80.00 per hour.
Defendant: $1,600.00, based on 20 hours at $80.00 per hour.

Findings o£ Fact and
Conclusions of Law
Peterson et al vs. Peterson
Civil No. 7958
• 5 -

13.

The Utah State Department of Social Services has appeared in this

action and claims reimbursement from Defendant in the sum of $1,100.00 for
public assistance paid to Plaintiff and her minor children through November,
1985, which claim Defendant denies, and said issue is reserved for future
adjudication between said parties.
14.

Medical and dental health insurance coverage for the parties1

minor children should be provided by the parties, or the expenses therefor
otherwise satisfied by them, as follows:
A. Both Plaintiff and Defendant should procure and maintain
such insurance when and so long as offered to her or him as a fringe
benefit pursuant to their employment.
B. If neither party can obtain such insurance as a fringe
benefit through her or his employment, then each should obtain same
through their employment, if offered, and pay the premium expense
therefor as a wage or salary deduction.
C. If neither party can obtain such insurance through
employment, either as a fringe benefit or by paying for same, then
Defendant should obtain such insurance and maintain same by the
purchase of a private policy therefor, and the premium expense in
that regard should then be satisfied equally by the parties.
D. All expenses for medical and dental care for said minor
children which are not covered by insurance should be satisfied
equally by the parties.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiff is entitled to a decree of divorce from Defendant on

the grounds of cruelty.
2.

Plaintiff should be awarded the care, custody and control of the

minor children of the parties, subject to reasonable rights of visitation in
and for Defendant, which visitation rights are hereby defined as follows:

Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law
Peterson et al vs. Peterson
Civil No. 7958
- 9

13.

That by reason of the protracted separation of the parties, their

estrangement, the length of the marriage and the unlikelihood of reconciliation, the decree of divorce herein should become final upon entry thereof.
14.

Medical and dental health insurance coverage for the parties1

minor children should be provided by the parties, or the expenses therefor
otherwise satisfied by them, as follows:
A. Both Plaintiff and Defendant should procure and maintain
such insurance when and so long as offered to her or hint as a fringe
benefit pursuant to their employment.
B. If neither party can obtain such insurance as a fringe
benefit through her or his employment, then each should obtain same
through their employment, if offered, and pay the premium expense
therefor as a wage or salary deduction*
C» If neither party can obtain such insurance through
employment, either as a fringe benefit or by paying for same, then
Defendant should obtain such insurance and maintain same by the
purchase of a private policy therefor, and the premium expense in
that regard should then be satisfied equally by the parties.
D. All expenses for medical and dental care for said minor
children which are not covered by insurance should be satisfied
equally by the parties.
DATED this (Y

$

day of January, 1986.
BY THE COURT

CULLEJTT. CHRISTENSEN, District Judge

/
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^ MARgjS_TAYLOR^( 3203)
LABRUM § TAYLOR
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
108 NORTH MAIN STREET
P.O. BOX 724
RICHFIELD-, UTAH 84701
(801)896-6484
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF MILLARD COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

KELLY RENEE PETERSON and
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES,
DECREE OF DIVORCE
Plaintiffs,
vs.
JERRY ALLEN PETERSON,

Civil No. 7958

Defendant.

This cause having been tried to the Court sitting without a jury on
November 13, 1985, the Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen, Fourth Judicial
District Judge presiding, the parties each appearing in person and by counsel,
a stipulation having been read into the record wherein and whereby the parties
stipulated to a divisio"

nf

r*-r+?_in personal property, evidence having then

been offered and received, the Court having issued a memorandum decision, and
having directed that the Utah State Department of Social Services be named as
a party Plaintiff to facilitate an award of judgment against Defendant for
public assistance provided to Plaintiff and her two minor children, the Court

Decree of Divorce
Peterson et al vs. Peterson
Civil No. 7958
- 2

having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now decrees as
follows:
D E C R E E

1.

Plaintiff is awarded a decree of divorce from Defendant, which

decree shall become absolute and final upon entry.
2.

Plaintiff is awarded the care, custody and control of the minor

children of the parties, subject to reasonable rights of visitation in and for
Defendant, which visitation rights are hereby defined as follows:
A.
B.
C.
DE.
F.
G.
H.
years.
I.
Sunday.
3.

One-half of the Christmas holiday.
One-half of the Thanksgiving holiday.
Alternating visits on every other holiday.
Every other birthday,
Each Father's Day.
One month summer visit for each child when age 4 or less.
Five weeks summer visit at age 5.
Six weeks summer visit when the children reach the ages of 6
Every other weekend from 6:00 p.m. Friday to 6:00 p.m.

Defendant shall provide Plaintiff with advance notice of his

intent to exercise visitation rights, which notice shall be not less than 48
hours for other than summer visits, and not less than 2 weeks for summer
visits*
4.

As long as Defendant is drawing unemployment compensation in_the^

amount above indicated he shall pay the sum of $100.00 per month per child as
support money, payable one-half on the 1st and one-half on the 15th days of
each month beginning on the 1st day of December, 1985.

At such time as
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Defendant becomes gainfully employed whereby he produces income approximating
that customarily earned by him as above indicated, such support shall be
increased to the sum of $185.00 per month per child.
5. Plaintiff is hereby awarded alimony in the amount of $1.00 per
month, commencing on the 1st day of December, 1985, and continuing for a
period of three years or until the Plaintiff remarries or cohabits with
another person of the opposite sex, whichever event first occurs; provided
that should Defendant become employed in his usual employment, the Court shall
review thg matter of alimony upon petition being filed for that purpose.
6. Plaintiff is hereby awarded the following personal property:
(A) Bed
(B) Cedar Chest
(C) Children's beds and children's items.
(D) Large dresser which Plaintiff had before marriage
(E) Two tall 5 drawer dressers
(F) Small 3 drawer dresser
(G) Rocking chair
(H) Television
(I) Plaintiff's tapes and records
(J) Camera;
(K) The 1983 Ford car and the motorcycle, subject to the
indebtedness thereon;
(L) The Delta gift shop subject to the lease obligation incident
thereto.
7. Defendant is hereby awarded the following personal property:
(A) 3 antique dressers and dresser now in Defendant's possession
(B) Stereo
(C) Other items in house which Defendant owned before marriage
(D) 1978 Ford truck, subject to the indebtedness thereon
(E) Horse
(F) Water stock
(G) Washer and Dryer, subject to Plaintiff's use thereof for the
period hereinafter indicated.
(H) Defendant's tapes and records
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8". Plaintiff shall assume and pay the following debts and hold the
Defendant, harmless from liability thereon:
(A) The obligation to Zions Bank.
(B) The rental obligation on the Delta gift shop.
(C) Any debts separately incurred by her since the separation of the
parties.
9.

Defendant shall assume and pay the following debts and hold the

Plaintiff harmless from liability thereon:
(A) Fillmore Hospital
(B) Nephi Hospital
(C) Payson Hospital
(D) Commercial Credit
(E) Scipio Garage
(F) Valley Bank
<±r<*<(G)--Eva M e e k e r — ^ ° * > '
(H) Any other debts incurred during the marriage except as
specifically ordered to be paid by Plaintiff
(I) Any debts separately incurred by him since the separation
of the parties
10.

That the real property interest of the parties, including the

contracts, are awarded to the Defendant, provided that the Plaintiff shall be
entitled to reside in said premises and have the use of the washer and dryer
therein until June 1, 1986, at which time Plaintiff shall vacate said
premises; provided further that during the period of her occupancy, the
Plaintiff shall be responsible for payment of utility charges incurred during
such period.

Said real property is situate in Millard County, Utah, and is

particularly described as follows:
Commencing 831.80 feet East of the South Quarter
Corner of Section 18, Township 18 South, Range 2
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North
246,37 feet; thence East 409.00 feet; thence

Decree of Divorce
Peterson et al vs. Peterson
Civil No. 7958
- 5 -

North 391.0 feet; thence North 73o00,59" East
276.04 feet; thence South 718,00 feet; thence
West 673.00 feet to the point of beginning.
(Containing 6.42 acres, more or less)
Commencing 831.80 feet East of the North Quarter
Corner of Section 19, Township 18 South, Range 2
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence East
673.00 feet; thence South 264.00 feet; thence
West 673.00 feet; thence North 264.00 feet to the
point of beginning. (Containing 4.08 acres, more
or less)
11.

That each party is required to promptly execute and deliver such

documents as may be necessary or appropriate to accomplish the transfer and
disposition of the assets above noted.
12-

The Utah State Department of Social Services, being joined as a

party hereto, and claiming from Defendant reimbursement in the sum of
J $1,10(^00. for support paid to Plaintiff and said minor children, through the
month of November, 198S, a fact denied by Defendant, said issue is reserved
for further litigation, however, said Department is authorized to withhold and
deliver earnings according to law in the event of Defendants default in
payment of any judgment awarded thereby, and for the collection of any future
support obligation.
13.

That Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff as attorney's fees the sura

of $S00.00 plus costs of Court incurred, and Plaintiff is hereby awarded
judgment against Defendant in said sum.
14.

Medical and dental health insurance coverage for the parties'

minor children shall be provided by the parties, or the expenses therefor
otherwise satisfied by them, as follows:
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A. Both Plaintiff and Defendant shall procure and maintain such
insurance when and so long as offered to her or him as a fringe
benefit pursuant to their employment*
B. If neither party can obtain such insurance as a fringe
benefit through her or his employment, then each shall obtain same
through their employment, if offered, and pay the premium expense
therefor as a wage or salary deduction.
C. If neither party can obtain such insurance through
employment, either as a fringe benefit or by paying for same, then
Defendant shall obtain such insurance and maintain same by the
purchase of a private policy therefor, and the premium expense in
that regard shall then be satisfied equally by the_par£ies.
D. All expenses for medical and dental care for said minor
children which are not_covered by insurance shall be satisfied
equally by the j)artjesT~
"
" ""
DATED this 0^77
^ '

day of January, 1986.
BY THE COURT

CULLEN Y. CHRISTENSEN, District Judge
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I herewith and hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing DECREE OF
DIVORCE was placed in the United States mail at Richfield, Utah, with
first-class postage thereon fully prepaid, this ^
addressed as follows:
Richard K. Glauser, Esq.
McKAY, BURTON § THJRMAN
Suite 1200 - Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133

day of January, 1986,

